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This paper assesses whether the UK public finances were sustainable for the period 
1919 to 2001 using a nonlinear representation of the debt to GDP ratio and thus 
provides a more robust test of debt sustainability.  Empirical evidence supports debt 
sustainability.  Moreover, the ESTAR representation is evidence that sustainability is 
the result of active debt management rather than tax-smoothing.  The results strongly 
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UK Debt Sustainability: Some Nonlinear Evidence and Theoretical 
Implications 
 
Abstract: This paper assesses whether the UK public finances were sustainable for the 
period 1919 to 2001 using a nonlinear representation of the debt to GDP ratio and 
thus provides a more robust test of debt sustainability.  Empirical evidence supports 
debt sustainability.  Moreover, the ESTAR representation is evidence that 
sustainability is the result of active debt management rather than tax-smoothing.  The 






During the last quarter of the 20
th century the pattern of public debt 
accumulation in many OECD countries made the sustainability of fiscal policy an 
issue of debate.  Policy maker’s concerns surfaced in the form of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings legislation in the US and the fiscal criteria in the Maastricht Treaty and its 
successor the Stability and Growth Pact.  In the literature there were papers devoted to 
measuring the gap between existing policy and sustainable policy (Blanchard, 1990; 
Blanchard, Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor, 1990; Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor, 
1990), papers assessing the distribution of debt and taxes between generations 
(Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoff, 1992; 1993; 1994 and 1995), papers advocating 
present-value tests of the government intertemporal budget constraint (Hamilton and 
Flavin, 1986; Wilcox, 1989), papers focusing on alternative parameters from the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint (Trehan and Walsh, 1991; MacDonald, 
1992), papers attempting to provide better empirical tests of the present-value approach 
(Kremmers, 1988; 1989) and, papers using present-value tests to examine the 
sustainability of various countries public finances (Corsetti and Roubini, 1991). 
Testing the sustainability of fiscal policy using a present-value approach was 
pioneered by Hamilton and Flavin (1986).  Hamilton and Flavin interpreted the 
present-value tests as indicative of whether the government was subject to an 
intertemporal constraint similar to households.  An alternative interpretation was 
placed on present-value tests by Wilcox (1989) when he suggested that the 
government’s intertemporal budget constraint must hold ex-post but that it may not 
hold ex-ante.  The fact that the government is subject to an intertemporal budget 
constraint ex-post implies that the ratio of public debt to Gross Domestic Product   2
(GDP) will be mean-reverting over longer horizons.  Present-value tests that cannot 
reject the unit root are taken as evidence that current fiscal policy is unsustainable 
While Wilcox’s interpretation of the tests became the standard, the full 
implications of his interpretation are not always appreciated.  Wilcox only suggested 
that the constraint must hold ex-post but he did not specify the manner in which this 
would be achieved by the fiscal authorities.  Therefore, the appropriate test of fiscal 
policy sustainability should capture the possibility that the conduct of fiscal policy 
results in nonlinear movements in public debt.  In particular, the conduct of fiscal 
policy might be such that policy interventions to ensure sustainability might only 
occur when sizable deviations from normal levels of public indebtedness occur.  The 
acceptance of such a hypothesis has important theoritical implications because a 
nonlinear adjustment of this form is not consistent with the tax-smoothing hypothesis 
about the conduct of fiscal policy (Barro, 1979).  Therefore, the presence of 
nonlinearity in the UK debt to GDP ratio can be taken as evidence that the UK did not 
follow a tax-smoothing policy for the period in question.  This paper assesses whether 
the UK followed tax-smoothing policies between 1919 and 2001 using an ESTAR 
model to test for the presence of nonlinearity in the UK debt to GDP ratio. 
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows.  Section II motivates the 
choice of UK fiscal policy for the period since 1919, in addition to providing an 
overview of the philosophy of UK fiscal policy and public debt management for the 
period.  Section III presents a simple test of the active debt management hypothesis 
against the alternative tax-smoothing hypothesis using the debt-GDP ratio and 
recently developed techniques in parametric nonlinear modelling.  The procedure for 
selecting the appropriate modelling of the debt-GDP ratio is outlined in Section IV.  
The empirical results are presented in section V.  Section VI concludes the study.   
 
 
II.  UK Fiscal Policy and Post-World War I UK Debt Data 
  The behaviour of the UK debt to GDP ratio during the 20
th century suggests 
that the UK engaged in a more active management of the debt than might be 
consistent with tax-smoothing.  This behaviour is in contrast with UK behavior of the 
previous two centuries.  It is, therefore, not surprising to find that the empirical paper 
that lends support to the tax-smoothing hypothesis using UK data covers only the   3
period prior to 1919 (Barro, 1987).  Another paper that supports the tax-smoothing 
hypothesis uses US data for the period 1919 – 1983 (Barro, 1986).  It is therefore 
instructive to briefly examine the behaviour of UK debt since 1919 and to compare it 
with its behaviour prior to 1919. 
 
Pre- World War I UK Debt 
Following a century and a half of intermittent war public debt in the UK debt 
rose from a low of £2m in 1688 immediately after the ‘Glorious Revolution’ to 
£844.3m by 1819 (Mitchell, 1988).  It then declined slowly to £774.9m in 1835 before 
stabilising between £780m and £790m until it increased to £812m at the end of the 
Crimean War.  It is, therefore, not surprising that Barro (1987) found that UK fiscal 
policy for the period 1700 to 1918 was consistent with tax-smoothing – public debt 
was used primarily to finance each war.  However, it should be noted that income tax 
was used, even if only in a limited way, as a means of war finance in the UK (Barro 
(1987) also cites the use of debt management by the UK Treasury).  Indeed, income 
tax was first introduced as a means of war finance “in 1799 after six years of 
improvident financing of the French War, [it] was allowed to lapse in 1802 with the 
Peace of Amiens, but was reintroduced in 1806 in a stronger form and was retained 
until after the victory in 1815  ... Peel in 1842 ... reintroduced Pitt’s income tax” 
(Jenkins 1995:152).  Peel introduced the tax on a three-year basis but it was extended 
for two further three-year periods and two one-year periods before Gladstone 
extended it for seven years in his 1853 budget. 
Although there was a tendency in the UK to adjust taxes, if only partly, to pay 
for various wars, the capacity to do so was limited by a basic administrative structure 
for public finance.  However, that started to change from the middle of the 19
th 
century.  Gladstone’s marshalling of the budgetary resources meant that he increased 
the potential of the budget as an instrument of policy.  His centralisation of revenue 
and expenditure in the Consolidation Fund and the enforcement of uniformity in 
accounting methods and account presentation were the first two steps in this process 
(Hicks, 1958; Jenkins, 1995).  Therefore, as the 19
th century progressed the potential 
for active management of the public finances increased but it was the 20
th century 
before it became the norm.   4
  The natural logarithm of UK public debt is presented in Figure 1 with the 
corresponding data for the US presented for comparison purposes.
1   The smoother 
pattern of UK public debt accumulation prior to WWI is obvious.  While military 
conflict played a substantial part in the dramatic pattern in the US debt, the largest 
single cause driving the US figures relates to the perception of public debt held by 
leading figures in US policy making after achieving independence from the UK.  
Beginning with positions taken by Federalists like Alexander Hamilton and anti-
Federalists like Thomas Jefferson, public debt was viewed as either a blessing or a 
burden.  This was most dramatically illustrated in the middle of the 19
th century when 
Andrew Jackson was elected President on the promise to repay the public debt. 
 
Post-World War I UK Debt 
  Figure 2 presents the UK debt to GDP ratio for the period 1919 to 2001.
2  The 
ratio is driven by economic conditions during the interwar period.  There is a sharp 
rise in the ratio during WWII and an almost equally sharp decline in the post-WWII 
years.  A relatively sharp decline continues up to the late 1960’s when the ratio levels 
off. 
In preparing his 1919 budget Austen Chamberlain was faced with a debt that 
was 10 times that he faced in 1905 during his first period in the Treasury.  His 1919 
and 1920 budget sought substantial increases in taxation in an effort to deal with the 
debt overhang from the war – the 1920 increase in taxation was the largest as a 
percentage in the 20
th century (Jenkins, 1998:137-8).  It is accepted that a balanced-
budget
3 philosophy dominated British budgets in the interwar period with Chancellors 
identify debt redemption as a high priority (Winch, 1983; Richardson, 1983; Jenkins, 
1998).  Debt redemption was the primary aim of Chamberlain’s immediate successors 
Robert Horne and Stanley Baldwin (Jenkins, 1998:240 and 248).  By the mid 1920’s 
fiscal rectitude was being advocated as necessary to buttress the return of sterling to 
the Gold Standard.  Whereas, during the Churchill budgets of the mid-to-late 1920’s, 
                                                 
1 US debt data is from Gordon (1998) and UK debt is from Mitchell (1988) and International Financial 
Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund 
2 The debt and Gross Domestic Product figures are taken from Feinstein (1976) and the International 
Financial Statistics database of the International Monetary Fund. 
3 Payments to a Sinking Fund for debt redemption were included in the budget arithmetic.  This 
resulted in situations where the Chancellor was borrowing in order to pay into the Sinking Fund.  This 
arrangement was introduced in 1875 and amended to a fixed £40m payment in the 1923 budget of 
Stanley Baldwin.   5
the balanced-budget philosophy was justified by reference to Britian’s return to the 
Gold Standard, the break with the standard was also used to justify fiscal rectitude in 
the budgets of Philip Snowden as a counter to inflationary pressures (Winch, 1983).  
In fact, Snowden stated that his primary role was the reduction of the national debt 
(Jenkins, 1998:278). 
  The 1941 budget is seen as the beginning of the Keynesian Era because it was 
the first time the budget was used as an instrument of wider government policy 
(Feinstein, 1983).  Kingsley Wood’s budget paved the way for the 1944 White Paper 
on Employment Policy and the greater “management” of the UK economy.  The 1941 
budget was heavily influenced by Keynes’s monograph How to Pay for the War: A 
Radical Plan for the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
4  The budget included a standard 
income tax rate of 50% with a marginal rate of 97.5%, a small compulsory savings 
element with a partial repayment promised after the War.  Keynes advocated that such 
a repayment be financed by a pre-announced capital levy.  Hugh Dalton’s two 
immediate post-WWII budgets similarly followed this redistributive approach when 
he increased surtax and death duties (Jenkins, 1998:449) 
 
Keynes’s monograph How to Pay for the War: A Radical Plan for the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer is not inconsistent with his counter-cyclical demand 
management proposals nor is it inconsistent with the view that Keynes introduced a 
bias toward deficit accumulation by advocating deficit financing of public expenditure 
during recessions (Buchanan and Wagner, 1977).  The monograph is consistent with 
Keynes’s advocacy of discretionary rather than non-tax smoothing policies.  Cooley 
and Ohanian (1997) argue that this was a departure from tax-smoothing and show that 
the UK policy was in sharp contrast with the behaviour of the US authorities.  
Whereas the UK returned it debt-GDP ratio to it pre-war level by the mid-1950s, the 
US only returned to the ratio by the mid-1960s.
5 
 
In the decade and a half from 1951 Britain enjoyed good growth rates relative 
to its past performance (even if relatively poor by comparison with other countries 
                                                 
4 Recent work has examined Keynes’s advocacy of debt repayment in the immediate aftermath of 
WWII (Cooley and Ohanian, 1997; and Clarke, 1998). 
5 Barro (1986) finds US behaviour since WWI to be consistent with the tax-smoothing hypothesis.  
However, it should be noted that it is believed that the US authorities departed from tax smoothing to 
finance the Korean war (Ohanian, 1997).   6
during this period).  Budgetary issues assumed a lower priority during 1951-1967 
because of Balance of Payments and Sterling difficulties.  The improved growth 
performance helped reduce the debt to GDP ratio.  The improvement in the ratio was 
halted with the problems caused by the international economic environment plus 
Britain’s internal problems during the 1970’s. 
 
 
III.  Nonlinearity in the Debt-GDP Ratio 
  While not stated explicitly in the literature, the linear specification can be 
justified using the tax-smoothing hypothesis about the conduct of fiscal policy (Barro, 
1979).  The tax-smoothing hypothesis suggests that fiscal authorities choose to 
smooth taxes to avoid the intertemporal distortions associated with changing tax rates.  
The optimal tax rate is chosen such that the government intertemporal budget 
constraint holds in the limit and the result is that temporary shocks to public 
expenditure map into changes in public debt, with permanent shocks resulting in a 
change in the tax rate and no change in public debt.  Because the government budget 
intertemporal budget constraint is specified for an infinite horizon, once a temporary 
shocks such as wars has passed there should only be a very small change in any 
subsequent one period deficit, e.g. only a tiny surplus would be required to repay a 
100 unit debt over 1,000 years.  Moreover, the implications for all future deficits are 
the same and there should be no rush to repay the debt.  These features of the tax-
smoothing approach to fiscal policy have two implications for present-value tests of 
sustainability and their interpretation.  First, the slow repayment of any debt might 
make the process indistinguishable for a unit root process.  Second, there should be no 
attempt to return to some normal level of indebtedness in the short-run. 
Linear models are likely to be too restrictive to adequately capture 
asymmetries that may exist in the debt-GDP ratio (Sarno, 2001).  A parsimonious 
parametric time series model of nonlinear mean reversion which has been shown to 
approximate well a broad range of nonlinearity is the smooth transition autoregressive 
(STAR) model, as in Teräsvirta (1994).  The exponential smooth transition 
autoregressive model of order q [ESTAR(q)] may be written: 












i yt-i ][1 – exp{ –γ
*(yt-g – c
*)
2}]  +  ut   7
where yt is the debt-GDP ratio and is assumed stationary and ergodic, u t is a 
stochastic disturbance term, and γ > 0.
6  The exponential transition function 
F(yt−g)=1−exp[-γ
*(y t-g − c
 * )
  2 ] is U-shaped and bounded between zero and unity, 
with the (smoothness) parameter γ
* determining the speed of the transition process 
between extreme regimes.   The middle regime corresponds to F = 0, yt-g = c
*, when 
(1) becomes a linear AR(q) model: 




πiyt-i  +  ut 
The outer regime corresponds to the limit, lim│yt-g − c
* │→ ∞ when F=1 and (1) 
becomes a different AR(q) model: 








i )yt-i  +  ut 
Intermediate values of F will result in the dynamics governed by a linear combination 
of (2) and (3) with the weights given by (1−F) and F respectively.  Global stability of 
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πi ,  
then this would imply that the degree of mean reversion grows as the deviation from 
equilibrium grows, consistent with active management of public finances.  On the 
other hand, if the reverse inequality holds, then the degree of mean reversion shrinks 
as the degree of disequilibrium grows, consistent with the tax-smoothing hypothesis.  
Thus, from (5), we can deduce that support for the active debt management 




i  were negative and 
significantly different from zero, while support for the tax-smoothing hypothesis 
would be provided if this sum were positive and significantly different from zero. 
                                                 




*=0, or as a generalization of a special case of a double-threshold autoregressive (TAR) 
model, as in Teräsvirta (1994).  However, for STAR models, regime changes occur gradually (smooth) 
rather than abruptly, as they do in TAR models.  A smooth, rather than a discreet regime change is 
likely to be more realistic and appropriate when dealing with aggregated processes (Granger and 
Teräsvirta, 1993; Teräsvirta, 1994).   8
  For our purpose, it is worthwhile to reparameterise the ESTAR model in (1) 
as: 
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In this form the crucial parameters are λ and λ
*.  For global stability we require 
(λ+λ
*)<0.  However, if it is the case that the larger the deviation from the long-run 
equilibrium, the stronger is the tendency to move back to fundamental equilibrium, 
then we must have λ
*<0 and (λ+λ
*)<0, while λ≥0 is possible.  That is, for small 
deviations yt may follow a unit root or even explosive behaviour, but for large 
deviations the process is mean reverting. 
  As pointed out by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), representing the ESTAR 
model in the form of (6) allows us to compare it with the linear augmented Dickey-







δi ∆yt-i  +  ut ,  where the unit root 
hypothesis H0: λ=0.  However, if (λ+λ
*)<0 and λ
*<0, indicating that yt is a nonlinear 
stationary process we still might find that λ=0.  That is, if yt is best described as an 
ESTAR process, failure to reject the unit root hypothesis using a standard linear ADF 
does not necessarily imply that yt is not mean reverting. 
   
     
  
IV.  Linearity testing and model selection 
Teräsvirta (1994) suggest testing linearity against ESTAR by first specifying 
the appropriate order of the autoregressive components, q, and suggests choosing this 
from an examination of the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) of yt  in the usual 
fashion.  For a given value of the delay parameter g, Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) 
and Teräsvirta (1994) show that appropriate tests of the null hypothesis of linearity 
against an alternative hypothesis of nonlinear adjustment may be based on the 
artificial regression: 




( β1i yt-i  + β2i yt-i yt-g  + β3i yt-i y
2
g t−  + β4i yt-i y
3
g t−  )  +  εt .   9
Since (7) may be viewed as a reparameterization of (1), with an unrestricted third-
order Taylor series expansion of the transition function, an appropriate simple test of 
nonlinearity is clearly an F-test, F1, of the following restrictions on (7): 
(8)  H01:  β2i  = β3i  = β4i  = 0,    i = 1, …, q 
against the alternative that H01 is not valid. 
  If the transition function is of the exponential family discussed above, 
however, third-order terms vanish in its Taylor series expansion, see Granger and 
Teräsvirta (1993).  Intuitively, because the exponential transition function is U-shaped 
as a function of yt-g, it will be better approximated by a quadratic than by a cubic.  If 
the debt-GDP ratio averaged over the whole sample period has been close to the 




this further implies β2i = 0 in (7).  This reasoning therefore suggests the following 
sequence of tests: 
(9a)  H04:  β4i  = 0,    i = 1, …, q 
(9b)  H03:  β3i  = 0 │β4i  = 0,    i = 1, …, q 
(9c)  H02:  β2i  = 0 │β4i  = 0,    i = 1, …, q 
 
where we might denote the relevant Wald-statistics for (9a), (9b) and (9c) respectively 
by W4, W3 and W2 .  If the true model is ESTAR, we would expect not to reject H04 
but to reject H03, and if in addition the sample mean value of yt is close to the 
equilibrium value, we would expect not to reject H02. 
  Of course, in practice g is not known.  We therefore follow the procedure 
suggested by Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) and Teräsvirta (1994) for selecting g.  
This involves testing the null hypothesis H01 for a range of values of g =1,2,...G, and 
in each case calculating the Wald-statistic W1(g).  The delay parameter ĝ is then 
chosen such that W1(ĝ)=supg W1(g), g = 1,...., G.  Although it might be thought that 
maximizing the test statistic in this fashion would generate substantial pre-test bias, 
the Monte Carlo evidence of Teräsvirta (1994) suggests that this should only lead to 
slight bias in the test size.   If this procedure leads to linearity being rejected in favor 
of an ESTAR(q) model, we follow Tong (1990) in estimating (6) by nonlinear least 
squares, which provides estimators that are consistent and asymptotically normally 
distributed.  We use heteroskedasticity-robust forms of these Wald statistics in our 
empirical work (see White, 1980).   10
V. Empirical  Results 
The UK debt and GDP data for the period 1919 to 1960 are taken from 
Feinstein (1976) and for the period 1961 to 2001 comes from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics. 
The distribution properties of the UK debt-GDP ratio reveal some degree of 
persistence in the ratio and it tends to die away slowly.  The first-order autocorrelation 
values are close to one suggesting that the ratio is non-stationary.  Furthermore, when 
we reparameterize the standard linear AR(2) model
7 as an augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) regression, we find that for the UK debt-GDP ratio: 
 
(10)   ∆yt = 0.014  –  0.017yt-1  +  0.628 ∆yt-1 
                  (0.018)    (0.014)         (0.086) 
                  [0.796]  [–1.267]         [7.334] 
 
         R
2 = 0.39  SSE = 0.42  Q = 0.20 
 
 
where, yt is the debt-GDP ratio; ∆ is the first-difference operator; the figures in 
parentheses are standard errors and t-ratios are given in brackets. R
2 is the adjusted 
coefficient of determination; SSE is the sum of squared residuals; and Q denotes the 
marginal significance level for the Ljung-Box Q statistic test for serial correlation of 
the residual term. 
  These basic results indicate that standard ADF would accept the null 
hypothesis that the debt-GDP ratio is non-stationary.  However, as we outlined in 
section III, this does not necessarily imply that the debt-GDP ratio is not mean 
reverting.  If the true process for the debt-GDP ratio is nonlinear (of a form given by 
(6)) then even though λ=0 (as above), with a λ
* large and significantly negative, the 
larger the deviation of the debt-GDP ratio from its equilibrium, the stronger is the 
tendency for it to move back to its equilibrium level.  That is, for small deviations the 
debt-GDP ratio may follow a unit root or even explosive behaviour, but for large 
deviations the process is mean reverting. 
                                                 
7 The choice of a lag order q=2 is indicated by the partial autocorrelation function (PACF), see Figure 
3.  Furthermore, Granger and Teräsvirta (1993) suggests that the PACF approach is more appropriate 
than some information criteria, e.g., the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), because (i) the 
information criteria could be misleading when the true process is nonlinear, and (ii) unlike the 
information criteria selection processes, the PACF imposes no penalty on a higher order AR, when it 
may be the case that high-order AR models could provide reasonable approximations to a nonlinear 
model.   11
Examination of the PACF of the debt-GDP ratio yt (see Figure 3) reveals 
significant correlations up to order two.  Accordingly the linearity tests are based on 
the artificial regression (7) with q set equal to two.  Table 1, which reports tests of 
linearity, provides strong evidence of nonlinearity: W1 rejects linearity at the near 
zero percent level for g=3 and the W4, W3, and W2 statistics strongly suggest that an 
ESTAR(2) model with g=3 and π
*
0≠ 0 and/or c
*≠0 is the most appropriate 
parameterization for yt.  In estimating the nonlinear model we follow Teräsvirta 
(1994) and standardize the exponent of the transition function F by dividing it by σ
2
y 
the sample variance of yt, and choosing a starting value for the standardized 
smoothness parameter equal to 1. 
 
 
Table 1: p-Values for the Linearity Tests of the 
               Debt-GDP Ratio, yt: AR(2) 









  0.0180 
  0.0039 
  0.0005 
  0.0015 
  0.0492 
  0.3688 
  0.4227 
  0.0882 
  0.2254 
  0.1615 
  0.1336 
  0.0494 
  0.3827 
  0.4800 
  0.5186 
  0.2205 
  0.0697 
  0.0304 
  0.0011 
  0.0017 
  0.0067 
  0.1705 
  0.4500 
  0.1090 
  0.0287 
  0.0132 
  0.0392 
  0.2782 
  0.7136 
  0.4716 
  0.2079 
  0.1681 
Notes: The sample period is 1919-2001.  The artificial regression (7), 
used to calculate the linearity Wald-tests, are based on q set equal to two.  
All test statistics were constructed using heteroskedasticity-robust 
methods (see White, 1980). 
 
 
The estimated parsimonious nonlinear model is the ESTAR(2) model: 
(11)    ∆yt =  0.040   +  1.239 ∆yt-1     + [ –0.083yt-1 – 0.606 ∆yt-1 ] 
                    (0.014)     (0.193)                  (0.016)       (0.213)   
                    [2.824]     [6.429]                [–5.079]     [–2.842]       
 




                                           (2.745)                (0.025) 
                                           [2.187]              [57.410]  
 
         R
2 = 0.55      σ
2
y = 0.36       SSE = 0.30 
          LR(2) = 2.69 {0.07}    ARR(2) = 0.34 {0.72}    VR = 0.70 
 
 
   12
The figures in parentheses are standard errors and t-ratios are given in brackets.  For 
the LM and LR tests, marginal significance levels are given in braces. R
2 is the 
adjusted coefficient of determination; ARR(2) denotes a Lagrange multiplier test 
statistics for up to second-order autocorrelation of the residuals, as in Eitrheim and 
Teräsvirta (1996); VR is the ratio of the residual variance from the estimated ESTAR 
model to the residual variance from the estimated best fitting alternative linear model 
(that is an AR(2)); and σ
2
y is the sample variance of the debt-GDP ratio.  The 
likelihood ratio statistic LR(2) tests the two parsimonious parameter restrictions 
implicit in the estimated model against the unrestricted ESTAR(2) model – described 
by equation (6).  The estimated LR test statistic suggests that the restrictions hold at 
the 5 per cent significance level.   
The estimated model clearly fits well, with well determined coefficients and 
satisfactory diagnostics.  Moreover, the model reports a 30% reduction in the residual 
variance from the estimated ESTAR model compared to the linear regression (10).  
The scatter plot of the estimated transition function against (yt-3 – 1.455) given 
in Figure 4, shows that the distribution of the debt-GDP ratio is in fact more or less 
symmetrically distributed around the estimated mean. With a simple count showing 
slightly more than 50% of the deviations are below the mean.  Moreover, the pattern 
of the scatter plot is symmetric illustrating that the active management occurred when 
the ratio was substantially away from it equilibrium, either above or below.  This 
suggests that there was indeed a ‘Keynesian’ revolution in the UK.  It is interesting to 
compare the scatter plot for the UK with that for the US in Sarno (2001).  In the US 
the distribution is also symmetric in that there is approximately 50% above and below 
the mean.  However, the more extreme values in the scatter plot occur when the ratio 
is above its equilibrium. 
It is also apparent from Figure 4 that for large deviations from the ratio’s long-
run level there is some evidence of a very fast adjustment back towards its long-run 
level.  This impression is confirmed formally, with the unstandardized value of the 
(smoothness) parameter γ
* of about 16.76, suggesting a fast adjustment.  More 
importantly, a large number of observations lie in the outer regime (F=1) confirming 
the presence of strong nonlinearities properties of the debt-GDP ratio and with 
significant outer regime coefficients, the degree of mean reversion increases 
significantly with the size of the deviation of the debt-GDP ratio from its equilibrium.    13
Furthermore, from the empirical results presented in (11) when F=0 (middle regime) 
yt is a unit root process, but when F=1, the significant coefficient value of –0.083 on 
the yt-1 variable implies that yt is mean reverting and not a unit root.  Thus, UK debt-
GDP is a nonlinear mean-reverting process. 
The findings supports the hypothesis that governments react more strongly to 
deficits (and surpluses) when the deviation of the debt-GDP ratio from its equilibrium 
is large in absolute size and, therefore, the larger the deviation the stronger will be the 
tendency to move back to its equilibrium level.  Thus, for the UK, the results support 





The UK debt-GDP ratio is a nonlinear process with well determined 
coefficients, satisfactory diagnostics and a 30% reduction in the residual variance 
from the estimated ESTAR model compared to the linear regression.  The empirical 
results presented demonstrate that debt-GDP is a unit root process close to the 
equilibrium (middle regime), but it is mean reverting in the outer regime. Thus, UK 
debt-GDP is a nonlinear mean-reverting process.  A large number of observations lie 
in the outer regime confirming the presence of strong nonlinearities properties of the 
debt-GDP ratio with mean reversion increasing significantly with the size of the 
deviation from equilibrium. 
The ESTAR model allows us to discriminate between the active debt 
management hypothesis and the tax-smoothing hypothesis.  The findings strongly 
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Figure 1: Log UK and US Debt, 1691-1997
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Figure 2: UK Debt-GDP Ratio, 1919-2001
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Figure 3: Partial Autocorrelation function
UK Debt-GDP Ratio, 1919-2001
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Figure 4: Estimated Transition Function
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